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We use a random survey of Swedish human resource managers to study the reasons for wage 
rigidity. Our findings are as follows. First, during the exceptional recession of the 1990s only 
1.1 percent of workers received a wage cut. Second, much wage rigidity can be traced to 
behavioral mechanisms involving negative reciprocity, relative wage comparisons and money 
illusion. Third, the reasons for wage rigidity differ significantly between large and small 
establishments, and between the high- and low-end of the labor market. Fourth, there are 
significant empirical complementarities between efficiency wage mechanisms and worker 
bargaining strength, and between “exogenous” institutions and endogenous sources of wage 
rigidity. Fifth, external pay comparisons are a more important source of rigidity in highly 
unionized establishments. Sixth, there are significant gender differences in pay bargaining and 
work moral. 
JEL Classification: E24, J30, J50, C81. 
Keywords: wage rigidity, survey evidence, matched data, reciprocity, behavioral 
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The question of why wages appear rigid in spite of high unemployment is central to 
macroeconomics. It is also a key ingredient in discussions about the appropriate stance of 
fiscal and monetary policy, the need for European labor market reform, etc. Despite the 
important issues at stake there is still little agreement on the empirical relevance of the 
models proposed in the theoretical literature. A recent literature uses surveys of those who 
set wages to discriminate between models.
1 Many wage setters agree that much rigidity 
can be traced to endogenous mechanisms, unrelated to government regulation and union 
power. Many wage setters also attribute a primary role to fairness, gift exchange and 
money illusion. Based on such findings it has been argued that macroeconomic theory 
ought to be reformulated along behavioral lines, see Howitt (2002).  
  Though the burgeoning survey literature provides useful insights, it is necessarily 
subject to methodological problems. Some studies cover very few firms (Kaufman (1984) 
and Blinder and Choi (1990)), or focus on narrowly defined sectors (Agell and Lundborg 
(1995, 2003)). Most studies focus on large firms.
2 No study uses random sampling; in the 
most elaborate survey Bewley (1999) started by asking friends and colleagues for persons 
to interview. Since response rates are low non-response bias is an important issue. Finally, 
because of a lack of background data previous surveys have not been able to go very far 
in exploring causal mechanisms. 
  This paper addresses these issues. In cooperation with Statistics Sweden we have 
completed a fully representative survey of human resource managers. Our survey provides 
a balanced coverage of sectors of particular interest for students of wage rigidity, and we 
                                                            
1 See Kaufman (1984), Blinder and Choi (1990), Levine (1993), Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2003), Bewley 
(1995, 1999) and Campbell and Kamlani (1997).  
2 The mean number of employees for the firms interviewed by Blinder and Choi (1990) and Agell and 
Lundborg (1995) was 5767 and 1154, respectively. Bewley (1999) oversampled large companies, and 
interviewed the smallest firms only by accident. The sub-sample of 73 smaller firms surveyed by Campbell 
and Kamlani (1997) refers to firms with less than 1000 employees that were situated in a certain 
geographical area, and had a connection to the authors or to Colgate University. Kaufman (1984) focuses on 
small firms, but his 26 firms were not drawn at random, and they were concentrated to certain geographical 
areas. Levine’s (1993) sample consists of 139 compensation managers in the very largest US companies.    2
 
include a large number of firms in all size categories. We have a very high response rate 
of 75.1 percent, and non-response bias appears to be a negligible issue. Via Statistics 
Sweden we have rich background information about responding firms and their workers; 
this allows us to identify many regularities that we have not seen described in the 
preceding literature. Finally, the Swedish recession of the 1990s offers an ideal 
environment in which to study high-unemployment/low-inflation behavior, see Figure 1. 
Between 1990-94 unemployment (inclusive of those in labor market programs) increased 
from 2.8 to 13.6 percent.
3 When we conducted our survey in the Spring of 1999 
unemployment was still almost ten percent. Inflation was virtually zero; in the preceding 
five-year period average inflation was one percent, with little variation between years.  
Our main results are as follows. First, during the economic bust of the 1990s only 
1.1 percent of workers received a wage cut. Second, much wage rigidity can be traced to 
behavioral mechanisms involving negative reciprocity, relative wage comparisons and 
money illusion. Third, the reasons for wage rigidity differ significantly between large and 
small firms, and between the high- and low-end of the labor market. Fourth, there are 
strong empirical complementarities between efficiency wage mechanisms and bargaining 
mechanisms, and between “exogenous” institutions and endogenous sources of wage 
rigidity. Fifth, pay comparisons are a more important reason for wage rigidity in 
unionized firms; we view this as an indication that relative wage theories of rigidity are of 
greater relevance for Europe than for the United States. Sixth, there are significant gender 
differences in pay bargaining and work moral. 
The next section presents our survey design and method of analysis. Section II 
documents the pervasive nature of wage rigidity in Sweden. Section III deals with the role  
                                                            
3 During the first half of the 1990s the rate of job destruction was quite high in all sectors. According to the 
Labor Force Survey of Statistics Sweden, the number of employees decreased by 24 percent in 
manufacturing, by 19 percent in public administration, and by 16 percent in unskilled services (hotel and 
restaurants). For an extensive discussion of the Swedish crisis of the 1990s, see Lindbeck (1997).    3
 
Figure 1. Total unemployment and inflation in Sweden, 1980-2000 (Sources: 





























of country-specific institutions, and Section IV presents our evidence on the sources of 
endogenous rigidity. Section V turns to the issue of gender. A final section sums up. 
 
I. Survey design and statistical analysis 
Our sampling frame is the Business Register of Statistics Sweden, which includes the 
addresses to all workplaces in Sweden (877,768 establishments in 1999). We included 
four sectors in our sampling frame, selected to provide enough variation to cast light on 
various theories. Manufacturing has been at the center of attraction in much previous 
research. Skilled services (computer consultants, law firms, etc) is of interest because it 
represents a segment of the labor market with complicated jobs, and where models of   4
 
work-life incentives and promotion tournaments might be of particular relevance. 
Unskilled services (hotels and restaurants) is a sector with simple jobs, and in the absence 
of unions and government regulations the forces of demand and supply ought to matter a 
lot. Since we wanted to pay attention to differences between profit maximizing units and 
those that operate under other constraints we also included public sector administration. 
Since standard models of wage setting are probably less applicable for the smallest units, 
often run by a family, we excluded all units with less than five employees. After these 
exclusions, we were left with 29,782 establishments, divided among four sectors, and 
employing 1.14 million people (i.e. 28 percent of total Swedish employment). After 
dividing the remaining units in three size categories, we obtained the twelve strata of 
Table A1 in the Appendix. Cost considerations limited our sample to 1200 units, and we 
assigned a random sample of 100 to each stratum.
4 Statistics Sweden sent out our 
questionnaire in March 1999. After three written reminders, we obtained 885 useable 
replies, including answers from 300 units with less than 20 employees. This implies a 
very high response rate of 75.1 percent. Furthermore, Agell and Bennmarker (2002) show 
that the responses of late responders do not differ significantly from those of the 
immediate responders. We conclude that non-response bias is not an issue.  
All questions are closed ones, and we asked respondents to indicate their replies 
on an ordinal scale, with four or five options.
5 An accompanying letter promised that 
respondents’ anonymity would be preserved, and we asked for the cooperation from the 
human resource manager or someone with corresponding function. While some previous 
surveys asked respondents to react to a selection of theories of wage rigidity, most of our 
questions concern concrete issues of work and pay, and we emphasized that we were 
                                                            
4 Adherence to the rule of thumb that sample size should be proportional to the number of units in each 
stratum suggests that a large share of the sample should be allocated to the smallest units. But we would 
then get less reliable responses from the largest units employing thousands of employees. 
5 Agell and Bennmarker (2002) contain an English translation of the questionnaire.   5
 
interested in understanding practices at the respondent’s own unit. Like Bewley (1999) we 
tried to avoid hypothetical questions, and questions that required respondents to assess the 
general equilibrium implications of firm-level wage setting. We did not always make a 
distinction between mechanisms generating real and nominal rigidity. First, in the 
presence of small frictions that make it costly to change nominal prices, the mechanisms 
that generate real rigidity will also generate nominal rigidity; see Ball and Romer (1990). 
Second, in an environment of near-zero inflation it is difficult to distinguish between 
mechanisms generating real and nominal rigidity. Third, as noted by Campbell and 
Kamlani (1997, p. 764), the distinction between real and nominal wages has little meaning 
when asking firms why they do not lower wages during a recession, or how the internal 
wage structure affects effort and work morale. 
To uncover response patterns we estimate ordered logit models, regressing 
managers’ replies on the set of background variables shown in Table 1.
6 Most of these 
variables (including the dummies for sectoral affiliation) might appear in an ordinary 
earnings-equation, but we also include variables of special interest for students of wage 
rigidity. The first is unit size, measured by the number of employees. Large units may find 
it more difficult to monitor workers, and wage rigidity may then be associated with size 
because shirking is a bigger issue in large units. Alternatively, to the extent that larger 
units are more sensitive to work disruptions, worker bargaining power may be greater in 
larger units. We also include a measure of union density, and the share of employees on a 
permanent employment contract. The idea behind the latter variable is that workers’ 
bargaining power ought to be an increasing function of the share of employees with more 
                                                            
6 Our background variables come from three sources. First, the business register contains information about 
sectoral classifications, size, location, etc. Second, we asked managers about union density, pay systems and 
employment contracts. Third, for all but a handful of responding establishments Statistics Sweden could 
provide us with information about the demographic and economic characteristics of employees.   6
 
secure jobs. Alternatively, tenured employees may have higher pay because they can be 
expected to have built up a larger stock of match-specific human capital.  
As a consistency check, Table 2 shows the results when we regress earnings 
against our benchmark regressors. All coefficients are precisely estimated, and in 
agreement with the microeconomic wage equations for Sweden reported in Albaek et al. 
(1998) and Arai (2001). There is a positive and highly significant size-earnings effect, and 
negative effects on earnings from the shares of female and non-Nordic employees. The 
coefficient on the share of employees on a permanent contract has the predicted positive 
sign. The negative union-wage effect agrees with Arai (2001), who finds that Swedish 
workers who belong to a union have lower pay, and that this result remains even as he 
controls for a range of worker-firm characteristics. Arai reports evidence that the negative 
union-wage effect captures self-selection of low-ability workers into unions.  
 
II. The incidence of nominal wage cuts 
The huge increase in unemployment and the return of very low inflation suggest a climate 
conducive to downward wage flexibility. We asked respondents whether they had cut 
regular base pay “…at any time during the crisis years of the 1990s”. Twenty-eight units 
replied in the affirmative, implying that 3.2 percent of all units had cut regular pay. Wage 
cuts were the least common in the public sector (one unit had cut pay), and the most 
common in skilled services (12 units had cut pay). Simple t-tests reveal that wage-cutting 
establishments differ in important respects. They have fewer employees, they are less 
unionized, and they are more prone to operate a scheme of profit sharing.
7 
 
                                                            
7 The average number of employees is 67.6 in the sub-sample of wage cutting units and 97.8 in the sample 
of non-cutters. The average unionization rates of the two sub-samples are 52.8 and 71 percent, and the 
average percentages of employees covered by profit sharing are 64.3 and 30.7 percent.    7
 
Table 1. Explanatory variables used in our regression analysis 
 
 












No. of obs  
 










Share of employees belonging to a union 
 
Q  0.70  0.32  867 
 
Share of employees on permanent contract 
 
Q  0.85  0.20  879 
Share of female employees 
 
ER  0.41  0.25  845 
Share of non-Nordic employees 
 
ER  0.07  0.12  845 
Average age of employees 
 
ER  39.5  7.2  845 
(Average age of employees)
2/100 
 
       
Share of employees with only elementary education 
 
ER  0.21  0.18  845 
Share of employees with university education 
 
ER  0.33  0.28  845 
 
 
Panel B: Dummy variables 
 
Variable  Description 
 
 
Dummy variables indicating 
sectoral affiliation 
 
Responding units were classified into nine categories based on the SIC-
codes: K72; K73; part of K74; D20-21 and 23-27; D28-35; D15-19, 22 
and 36-37; H55; L75111-75212, 75231, 75232 and 75300; L75221-
75226 and 75233-75250. 
 
Multiunit  Dummy=1 if establishment is part of multiunit enterprise 
 
Situated in area with small-
sized labor market  
Dummy=1 if establishment is in area with low population density 
(Statistics Sweden regional codes H5, H6) 
 
Situated in area with 
medium-sized labor market 
 
Dummy=1 if establishment is in area with average population density 
(Statistics Sweden regional codes H3, H4) 
Notes: In the third column, BR stands for the Business Register of Statistics Sweden, Q for the questionnaire, and 
ER for the Employment Register of Statistics Sweden.  
   8
 
Table 2. The validity of our background data: OLS earnings-equation 
 
 
Explanatory variables  
 
Dependent variable: 
Log(Average earnings)  
 






Share of employees belonging to a union  -.127
a 
(.043) 













































See Table 1 
2 R (adjusted) 
 
.672 
No. of observations 
 
824 
Notes: Log(Average earnings) is calculated via the tax registers, included in the Employment register of 
Statistics Sweden. The regression includes the full set of regressors shown in Table 1, plus a constant. 
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
b denotes significance at the five percent level, and 
a at the one 





Many of the units that had cut pay had done so for a mere handful of employees, 
and only nine units indicated that they had cut pay for a majority of their employees. 
Seven of these belong in skilled services. Thus, although we cover a period of 5-6 
consecutive years of very high unemployment and near-zero inflation (see Figure 1), 
regular wage cuts were very uncommon, and the cuts that did occur are concentrated to 
strata that are less important in terms of total employment. Some calculations show that   9
 
our results imply that 1.1 percent of the 1.14 million workers who belong to our sample 
frame received a wage cut during the slump of the 1990s.
8  
 
III. Country-specific institutions 
Swedish labor law does not allow employers to impose unilateral nominal pay cuts. This 
is so also in a situation when the old wage contract has expired; the old contract prevails 
until the parties have reached a new agreement. Some recent theoretical papers show that 
the provision that nominal wage contracts can only be changed by mutual consent is a 
potentially important source of nominal rigidity, see MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) and 
Holden (1994, 2002). In addition, many Swedish workers have their wages set in a two-
tier system, where industry-level negotiations precede plant-level negotiations. The 
(minimum) wage levels specified in the industry-level agreements specify a floor, which 
must not be undercut by the plant-level agreement. Holden (1998) shows that two-tier 
bargaining can be an independent source of wage rigidity.  
The following evidence suggests that institutions play a role. First, many managers 
indicate that job protection creates substantial costs of hirings and firings (see below). 
This vindicates a key assumption in the theoretical models of MacLeod and Malcomson 
(1993) and Holden (1994). In their models, a wage cut requires a mutual agreement 
between firm and worker, and the firm must not fire the worker and offer re-employment 
at a lower wage. It is this assumption that firing costs are large that gives workers a 
strategic advantage when they try to prevent a nominal wage cut. Second, two-tier wage 
bargaining is the least common in skilled services. Based on this, we would expect the 
                                                            
8 The 95% confidence interval for this estimate is 0.5%-1.7%. For each unit we computed the number of 
employees who had experienced a wage cut. To aggregate to the population level, we used each stratum’s 
share of total employment. To compute the confidence interval we generated a bootstrap distribution with 
10000 elements; see Agell and Bennmarker (2002). For comparison, Ekberg (2002) finds that 1.15 percent 
of all private sector white-collar workers received a cut in baseline pay between 1996-99, and Agell and   10
 
incidence of wage cuts to be significantly higher in this sector, which is indeed the case. 
Third, union density is significantly lower among wage cutting units, which is another 
indication that collective bargaining matters for wage rigidity.  
Fourth, it is instructive to compare our results with those from countries with other 
institutions but a similar macroeconomic experience. In the United States, Canada and 
Switzerland an employer may dismiss a worker who refuses to take a wage cut, and these 
countries also underwent recessions during the early 1990s. US unemployment (as 
standardized by the OECD) stood at 5.6 percent in 1990, and peaked at 7.5 percent in 
1992. Bewley (1999) actively sought out firms that had cut pay during the recession in 
Massachusetts, and he found that 24 of 235 interviewed businesses (10.2 percent) had 
reduced the base pay of some or all employees. Canadian unemployment stood at 8.1 
percent in 1990, and peaked at 11.4 percent in 1993. Christofides and Stengos (2001) 
show that out of 2194 union settlements between 1991-94, 3.6 percent (80 contracts) 
included nominal wage cuts. Swiss unemployment stood at 1.9 percent in 1991, and had 
doubled in 1993. Fehr and Goette (2000) find that at most 8 percent of all Swiss workers 
received a wage cut.  
Because data sources and methodology differ between studies it is not easy to 
compare wage rigidity across countries. Even so, we conclude that wage rigidity is more 
complete in Sweden than in the United States, Canada and Switzerland. Our finding that 
1.1 percent of Swedish workers received a wage cut refers to the incidence during the 
complete time span of the recession, and the Swedish recession appears to have been 
significantly more severe than the recessions in the United States and Switzerland, and 
comparable to the recession in Canada. We view this as circumstantial evidence that 
country-specific institutions can lead to substantial downward nominal wage rigidity.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
Lundborg (2003) find that none of 159 large manufacturing firms had implemented a comprehensive wage 
cut during the Swedish recession of the 1990s.    11
 
IV. Endogenous wage rigidity 
A. Wage competition from the unemployed 
Will a depressed labor market make unemployed job seekers more willing to offer to 
work for less than the going wage? Solow (1990) argues that a social norm deters the 
unemployed from undercutting, and the surveys of Agell and Lundborg (1995, 2003) and 
Bewley (1999) suggest that undercutting is relatively uncommon. We asked:  
 
Does it happen that your workplace is approached by job seekers who offer to work under 
conditions that are inferior (lower pay, less convenient hours, poorer work environment, 
etc.) to those you normally offer new employees with corresponding qualifications?  
 
In view of the severity of the Swedish recession, and because of our broad interpretation 
of undercutting, we expected many managers to answer in the affirmative. But in fact only 
119 units (13.5 percent) indicated that they had encountered undercutters, and the 
incidence of underbidding was low in all sectors, ranging from 11.4 percent in public 
administration to 19.4 percent in unskilled services.  
Though this result is consistent with the social norm argument of Solow, it is even 
more striking to note that 89.6 percent of the managers who had encountered undercutters 
indicated that they had always rejected the offer. The rejection of undercutters is a general 
phenomenon, pertaining to firms in very different sectors, and different size categories. 
The rejection rates range from 97 percent in manufacturing to 82.1 percent in public 
administration. The rejection rate for units with less than 20 employees is 90.2 percent, 
and for units with more than 200 employees it is 86.7 percent. Judged against these 
rejection rates, the low incidence of undercutting is not surprising. Offering to work for 
little pay is not a successful strategy for landing a job.
9  
                                                            
9 These rejection rates coincide with experimental evidence. Fehr and Falk (1999) study a gift exchange 
game between firms and workers. Both workers and firms may present bids and counter-bids, and firms are   12
 
Table 3. Most important reasons to reject underbidders 
 
 
Percentage of respondents that rank the reason as most important in 
















Violates firm’s personnel policy; 












37.0  29.9  42.0  28.5 
Violates collective bargaining 
   agreement; unions resist 
   underbidders 
 
18.2  33.0  16.4  42.1 
Underbidders have inferior skills 
 
  3.1    4.5    4.5    0.0 




We asked respondents to rank the reasons for rejection; see Table 3. In 
manufacturing and skilled services, concerns over personnel policy and internal conflict 
were the most important factors – factors emphasized in e.g. sociological efficiency wage 
models. In public administration, unions and collective bargaining contracts were more 
important factors. It should be noted that less than five percent of managers pointed to the 
factor “underbidders have inferior skills.” We conclude that understanding wage rigidity 
at the hiring margin requires that the searchlight is aimed at the firm and its incumbent 
employees, rather than at the job seeker.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
not allowed to condition the wage on effort. In anticipation of a reciprocal effort bonus firms typically 
offered wages that were substantially above the market-clearing level, and they refused to hire workers who 
offered to work for low pay. Unlike the survey evidence, however, Fehr and Falk report that unemployed 
workers engage in considerable underbidding, in spite of very high rejection rates.    13
 
B. Wages, monitoring, and reciprocity 
A basic issue in models of motivation is whether firms can appraise work effort. For 
example, the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) rests on the idea that wage 
rigidity occurs because workers try to take advantage of the imperfect monitoring capacity 
of managers. When we asked, “to what extent can you evaluate whether a specific 
employee performs satisfactorily on the job?” 50.7 percent of respondents indicated that 
they could evaluate performance “to a very great extent”, while 49.3 percent indicated 
that they were less than certain about performance.  
  Most efficiency wage models predict that changes in external wages (the outside 
option) have an impact on work effort. This is true of the shirking model, but it also 
applies for versions of the gift-exchange model of Akerlof (1982) in which workers’ 
reference norms extend to workers in other firms. As a test of this implication we asked: 
“How do you think that the work effort of your employees would be affected if 
wages/salaries increased in comparable companies or organizations, but stayed the same 
at your unit?” Figure 2 shows that a great majority (581 out of 882 managers) thought that 
higher external wages would lower effort. We view this as an indication that many 
managers perceive a strong incentive to maintain external wage relativities. This result is 
consistent with Keynes’s (1936, p. 14) view of wage rigidity as a coordination failure in 
an economy where workers care about relative pay; below, we return to this issue.  
  A large experimental literature shows that reciprocity is an important motivational 
factor for many people, see e.g. Fehr and Gächter (2000). There are also evidence from 
experimental labor markets suggesting that the risk that workers will retaliate by reducing 
effort makes firms unwilling to cut pay despite high unemployment, see e.g. Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993). We asked a question that tried to capture the essence of 
negative reciprocity: “In your opinion, do those of your employees who are dissatisfied    14
 
Figure 2. “How do you think that the work effort of your employees would 
be affected if wages/salaries increased in comparable firms or 
organizations, but stayed the same at your unit?” (882 respondents) 
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with their pay normally reduce effort?” In line with the experimental evidence, 49 percent 
of managers replied in the affirmative, 28.9 percent answered that such a response was 
possible but not common, while 22.1 percent ruled out the possibility altogether. 
Table 4 presents our ordered logit analysis of managers’ responses to our 
questions on monitoring, the outside option, and negative reciprocity (the right-hand side 
variables include all the variables listed in Table 1). Columns 1, 2, and 4 show that there 
appears to be a clear pattern involving establishment size. Managers in large 
establishments are (i) less able to appraise work performance, (ii) more likely to identify a 
negative link between effort and external pay, and (iii) more likely to indicate that 
reciprocity is an important issue. These effects are estimated with high precision, and they 
survive an extended sensitivity analysis.
10 Few other regressors are statistically 
                                                            
10 Due to space constraints we refer to Table 10 in Agell and Bennmarker (2002).    15
 
significant. Unions might interfere with a firm’s monitoring strategy, and educated 
workers hold more complicated jobs, but neither union density nor the share of employees 
with university education are statistically significant in column 1. In the reciprocity 
regression (column 4), however, the share of female employees enters with a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient (p-value < .01); we explore this result further below.  
A straightforward shirking explanation for the size effects identified in the 
preceding paragraph is as follows. Since managers in larger units find it more difficult to 
appraise performance, work effort in larger units should be more responsive to the outside 
option. For the same reason managers in larger units should find it more difficult to 
prevent acts of negative reciprocity. If this explanation is correct the size effects in 
columns 2 and 4 should not survive if we add an explicit measure of monitoring capacity 
to the estimating equation. However, in columns 3 and 5 we can see that the coefficients 
on the size variable change only marginally, and remain significant at the one-percent 
level, even as we add managers’ own assessment of monitoring ability to the estimating 
equation. It appears that insufficient monitoring capacity is not the primary reason that 
managers in larger establishments view external pay and negative reciprocity as more 
important constraints for their pay policy.
11 Alternatively, Encinosa, Gaynor and Rebitzer 
(1997) have suggested that peer pressure and group interaction effects are more important 
motivational devices in smaller establishments, where there is a close social distance 
between workers, and between workers and management. If this is true, managers in 
smaller establishments may benefit from binding work norms that prevents acts of 
negative reciprocity, and reduces the importance of the outside option.  
                                                            
11 We obtained additional evidence against a shirking interpretation when we asked managers to rank the 
importance of different incentive devices. Few managers indicated that monitoring and supervision were 
important motivational tools, and these responses did not differ between large and small units; see Agell and 
Bennmarker (2002) for further details. Bewley (1999, p. 110) notes that most managers insisted that the 
shirking model “…did not describe their own behavior, but rather a bad form of management.”   16
 
Summarizing, two-thirds of our respondents believe that an increase in outside 
wages damages performance at their workplace, and almost fifty percent indicate that 
negative reciprocity is an important issue. We view this as clear evidence that most 
managers think that downward wage flexibility may have important adverse consequences 
for profitability. Obviously, this is the essence of efficiency wage theory. We have also 
identified a robust size effect, suggesting that outside wages and negative reciprocity are 
of greater importance in larger units. This is consistent with the size-earnings premium 
identified in Table 2, and with our finding in Section II that regular wage cuts were the 
least common among larger units.  
 
C. Wages and voluntary turnover 
A potentially important deterrent to wage cuts is the risk that dissatisfied employees chose 
the exit option, quits. We asked, “In your opinion, do those of your employees who are 
dissatisfied with their pay normally seek employment elsewhere?”. Out of 880 responding 
managers, 58.5 percent replied in the affirmative, 29.4 percent indicated that voluntary 
turnover was possible but uncommon, while 12.1 percent ruled out this possibility 
altogether. It appears that many managers view the risk of voluntary turnover as an 
important constraint on their wage policy.  
  Table 5 shows our analysis of the determinants of voluntary turnover. The positive 
coefficient on the share of employees with university education indicates that the risk of 
quits is greater in units with a large share of highly educated employees. The negative 
coefficient on the share of workers on a permanent contract is consistent with the idea that 
tenured employees can be expected to have built up a greater stock of match-specific 
human capital. The negative coefficient on the dummy indicating that the firm is situated 









Higher external wages lower 
effort of your employees? 
 
Do employees who feel 
underpaid normally reduce 
effort? 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
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.034  .028  .029  .023  .024 
No. of obs. 
 
823  822  822  815  814 
Notes: In all columns the estimation method is maximum likelihood ordered logit. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
c denotes significance at the 
ten percent level, 
b at the five percent level, and 
a at the one percent level. Ability to evaluate work performance is a dummy variable defined from the 
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Do employees who feel underpaid 
normally seek other jobs?  
 
Higher benefits lower effort of your 
employees? 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Share of employees with only elementary 
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of Table 1  
Pseudo R-squared 
 
.056  .033  .048  .027 
No. of obs. 
 
821  841  818  836 
Notes: In all columns the estimation method is maximum likelihood ordered logit. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
c denotes significance 
at the ten percent level, 
b at the five percent level, and 
a at the one percent level. 
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their feet depend on opportunities offered elsewhere. The negative coefficient on the 
union variable indicates that the risk of voluntary turnover is smaller in highly unionized 
firms. To the extent that unions extract rents in the local wage bargain, this is what one 
should expect.
12  
As a sensitivity check we started with the full set of regressors of Table 1, and then 
eliminated insignificant variables in a stepwise procedure, starting with the least significant 
variable. Excluding all variables not significant at the five-percent level, both the share of 
workers on a permanent contract and our dummy indicating a small local labor market 
drop out from the final model (the latter is eliminated in the last round, with p-value = 
.055). Both the university and union variables are in the final model, with p-value < .001. 
Employees with university training are also better paid, and in column 2 we show that 
there is a positive and statistically significant partial correlation between earnings and the 
risk of voluntary turnover (since our full set of regressors includes many variables that 
should explain earnings, this regression only controls for sectoral affiliation). 
  We conclude that the risk of voluntary labor turnover is an important source of 
wage rigidity, and that this mechanism is particularly relevant for the high-end of the 
labor market, where workers are highly educated, lowly unionized and have access to a 
large local labor market. For comparison, Agell and Lundborg (1995) and Campbell and 
Kamlani (1997) report that reducing voluntary turnover is a more important explanation 
of wage rigidity for white-collar than blue-collar workers. 
 
                                                            
12 The negative union-wage effect discussed in Section I is fully compatible with union rent sharing. 
According to Arai (2001) the negative union-wage effect in Swedish micro-data reflects self-selection of 
low-ability workers into unions. These low-ability workers should still earn a rent from union membership.   20
 
D. Benefits and shirking 
The shirking model predicts that more generous unemployment compensation induces 
workers to slacken off. We asked: “How do you think that the work effort of your 
employees would be affected if unemployment benefits were increased?” Though a large 
majority believed that higher external wages led to lower effort, few respondents thought 
the same of higher benefits. Only 125 managers (14.3 percent) indicated that more 
generous benefits would induce their employees to reduce effort. But benefits might still 
matter for the low-end of the labor market. While only 8.3 percent of managers in skilled 
services responded that higher benefits would reduce effort, 28 percent of those in 
unskilled services responded the same. 
  Column 3 of Table 5 shows our analysis of the link between effort and benefits. 
The coefficients on the share of employees on a permanent contract and the share of 
employees with only elementary education are significant at the one-percent level. Both 
measures remain in the final model as we repeat the step-wise elimination test of the 
previous section. Thus, managers with a large share of employees on temporary contracts, 
and with a large share of lowly educated workers, are more prone to identify a negative 
link between benefits and effort. Employees who are lowly educated are also lowly paid, 
and column 4 shows that there is a significant negative partial correlation between 
average earnings and managers’ perception that generous benefits are harmful to effort. 
  Summarizing, we do not find much evidence that benefits play a role via their 
impact on shirking and effort. But benefits may still matter for the low-end of the labor 
market, where workers are lowly educated and temporary contracts more common. 
Similarly, Bewley (1999) reports that though most US managers dismissed the shirking 
model as irrelevant, some remarked that it might apply to the market for low paid 
temporary labor. As noted by Bewley (1999, p. 110), this appears contrary to the spirit of   21
 
the shirking model, since it was originally developed to explain why wages are pushed up 
above the market clearing-level in the primary labor market.  
 
E. Bargaining, job protection and negative reciprocity 
A large class of models links unemployment and wage rigidity to the bargaining power of 
incumbent workers.
13 An implication of all these models is that workers capture a share of 
the firm’s surplus in the bargain. We asked: 
 
How common is it that your employees (or their union representatives) require wage hikes 
because of high profits, or high ability to pay, in your firm/organization?  
 
The answers suggest that profits/ability to pay is important in manufacturing and skilled 
services, and less important in unskilled services and the public sector. In manufacturing 
and skilled services 43.5 and 48.2 percent of managers indicated that workers often 
require higher wages in times of high profits/ability to pay. In unskilled services and 
public administration, the numbers were 20.9 and 17.0 percent. 
We used these answers to create a proxy-variable for the rent sharing, or 
bargaining strength, of employees. We classified establishments on an ordinal scale, 
depending on the importance of profits/ability to pay in the local pay bargain, and used 
this measure as the left-hand side variable in our econometric analysis.
14 Table 6, column 
1, shows that both establishment size and share of employees on a permanent contract 
show up with positive signs. These variables are significant at the five-percent level (or 
more), and survive our step-wise elimination test. The coefficient on the union variable 
                                                            
13 In the efficient bargaining model of McDonald and Solow (1981) worker bargaining power has no effect 
on employment.  
14 Our argument is that in an establishment where the employer has all the bargaining power workers would 
never ask for higher wages because of high profits/ability to pay, while the opposite would apply in an 
establishment where employers have little bargaining power. Our measure of employee bargaining strength 
is correlated with earnings; in an OLS earnings equation with sectoral and geographical controls its 
coefficient is positive, and significant at the one-percent level.    22
 
has a positive sign, but the standard error is large (p-value = .131). Finally, we estimate a 
statistically significant gender effect (discussed below): establishments with a large share 
of female employees are less prone to indicate that profits/ability to pay is an important 
factor in the local wage bargain.  
Columns 2-5 examine two additional issues. First, many theoretical bargaining 
models predict that strict job protection will increase wage pressure and lower 
employment, for the reason that job protection strengthens the bargaining position of 
incumbent workers; see Bertola (1999) for a discussion. To assess whether managers 
viewed job protection as an important factor we asked how job security affected the 
screening of job applicants, and 54 percent indicated that job protection to a “very great” 
or “great” extent boosted their screening effort. Another 38 percent indicated equally 
strong support for the proposition that job security lowered their propensity to hire people 
in an economic upturn, and increased the propensity to rely on overtime hours. In columns 
2 and 3 we add the responses to these questions to the estimating equation. The 
coefficients on both measures are positive, precisely estimated (p-values are .001 for both 
coefficients), and robust with respect to the step-wise elimination procedure. Managers 
indicating that job protection creates important effects are more prone to indicate that 
employees bargain for higher wages in times of high profits/ability to pay. These 
correlations fit the predictions from a large class of insider-outsider models.  
Second, Summers (1988) argues that the presence of efficiency wage mechanisms 
magnify greatly the effects of worker/union bargaining power. In an “...efficiency wage 
environment, firms that are forced to pay their workers premium wages suffer only 
second-order losses. In almost any plausible bargaining framework, this makes it easier 
for workers to extract concessions” (Summers (1988, p. 386)). Our finding that 
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.097  .101  .107  .099  .100 
No. of obs. 
 
817  806  805  810  816 
Notes: In all columns the estimation method is maximum likelihood ordered logit. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
c denotes significance at the ten 
percent level, 
b at the five percent level, and 
a at the one percent level. The two job protection variables as well as the reciprocity and voluntary turnover 
variables take on integer values from one to five, and they are defined from the answers to these questions on our questionnaire. In alternative regressions, 
we defined these variables as dummy (dichotomous) variables. This did not produce qualitatively different results.  
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with our indicator of negative reciprocity appears to corroborate this conjecture. To 
further explore this issue we added the responses to our questions on negative reciprocity 
and voluntary labor turnover to the estimating equations, see columns 4-5. The estimated 
coefficients on these variables are positive, statistically significant, and robust with 
respect to the step-wise elimination procedure. Managers indicating that negative 
reciprocity and voluntary turnover are important factors also tend to indicate that 
profits/ability to pay is of great importance in the local pay bargain.  
Summing up, many managers indicate that wage claims are responsive to profits 
and ability to pay. This finding is consistent with a main implication from a large class of 
bargaining models of unemployment and wage rigidity. We have also reported evidence 
that worker bargaining power is reinforced by efficiency wage mechanisms involving 
reciprocity and voluntary turnover, and by strict job protection. These possibilities are 
seldom acknowledged in theoretical models of wage bargaining.  
 
F. Workers' wage norms, unions, and Keynes’s explanation 
A classic explanation of wage rigidity is the argument of Keynes (1936, p. 14) that workers 
care about relative wages. Because of this they oppose nominal wage cuts, unless wages can 
be cut in a coordinated manner throughout the economy. If such comparisons are to 
generate more than a limited amount of wage rigidity, they should extend beyond workers 
in the same firm. Surveys among US managers suggest, however, that employees mainly 
pay attention to the internal wage structure. Campbell and Kamlani (1997, p. 780) report 
that workers’ notion of fair pay depend on own past wages, firm’s profits, and wages of 
other workers in the same firm. Bewley (1998, p. 485) concludes that Keynes’s theory is off 
the mark, since workers in the firms he approached had ”…little systematic knowledge of 
pay rates at other firms”.    25
 
In sharp contrast to this evidence, most Swedish managers indicate that both internal 
and external wages are important considerations in the local wage bargain. Across all strata, 
47.3 percent indicated that internal wage comparisons “always” or “frequently” played an 
important role, and 41.8 percent said the same about external wages. What can explain this 
difference between US and Swedish field surveys? Bewley (1998) conjectures that unions 
might play a role, and he notes that the precision of the information about external pay 
appears to be higher among workers in unionized firms. There is substantial variation in our 
union variable, with 404 establishments indicating that union density exceeds .9, and 91 
establishments indicating that union density is below .1. This variation allows us to identify 
any union effects on wage norms with some precision. The first two columns of Table 7 
show our analysis of the determinants of wage norms. Union density is positively and 
significantly correlated with the intensity of both internal (p-value = .018) and external (p-
value = .008) wage comparisons. In our step-wise regressions union density stays in the 
final model, with p-value = .01 in both equations.  
Among the other regressors establishment size enters with statistically significant 
coefficients in both columns (these effects survive our step-wise regressions). These 
correlations, suggesting that wage relativities are a bigger issue in large firms, are in line 
with our previous finding that efficiency wage mechanisms play a more important role in 
large establishments. The coefficient on the share of employees with a university education 
is positive and significant at the ten percent level in column 2 (p-value = .055). When we 
eliminate regressors not significant at the five-percent level, our university measure remains 
in the final model with p-value < .01. This result agrees with Andrews and Henry (1963), 
who report that interest in external pay increases with the job level. Finally, the coefficient 
on the share of female employees is negative and statistically significant in both columns 1 
and 2. We return to the possible role of gender in shaping wage norms in the next section.    26
 
We obtained further support for the view that Keynes’s explanation of wage rigidity 
holds more promise for unionized firms when we asked directly how well the following 
coincided with managers’ experience at their own establishment:  
 
Some researchers argue that the reason why wages seldom fall is that wage relativities 
might be altered. Employees try to protect their position in the wage hierarchy, and they 
resist wage cuts because they are afraid that they will fall behind other employees, at their 
own or other units.  
 
Almost 49 percent indicated that this mechanism coincided “completely” or “to a great 
extent” with their own experience. (For comparison, when we asked a similar question 
about the labor turnover version of the insider-outsider model, only 14 percent of 
respondents indicated that this model coincided “completely” or “to a great extent” with 
their own experience. For further details, see Agell and Bennmarker (2002)). Column 3 of 
Table 7 shows that there is a significant partial correlation between union density and 
respondents’ appreciation of Keynes’s theory. In the step-wise regression, union density 
remains in the final model, with p-value = .006.  
We view these results as an indication that relative wage theories of rigidity offer 
greater promise for unionized European economies than for the United States. It is of 
interest to note that Keynes’s view on wage rigidity appears to be based on the British 
experience in the 1920s, when unions played a much more important role than has ever 
been the case in the United States. Keynes (1925) is a publication preceding The General 
Theory, which explains British miners’ resistance to wage cuts in terms of wage fairness.  
 Table 7. Workers’ wage norms in the local bargain 
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.086  .055  .012 
No. of obs. 
 
819  819  797 
Notes: In all columns the estimation method is maximum likelihood ordered logit. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
c 
denotes significance at the ten percent level, 
b at the five percent level, and 
a at the one percent level. 
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G. Money illusion 
Money illusion is often taken to mean that agents have preferences defined over nominal 
rather than real outcomes. The surveys of popular attitudes of Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler (1986) and Shafir, Diamond, and Tversky (1997) suggest that money illusion is an 
important phenomenon. Similarly, Bewley (1999) observes that many managers were 
convinced that their employees would consider a nominal wage cut as highly unfair, even 
as an insult. We asked managers to react to the following scenarios, adapted from 
Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986, p. 731):  
 
Scenario 1 (872 respondents). Assume hypothetically that your enterprise is making a 
small surplus. There is no inflation, and unemployment is high. There are many job 
seekers applying for a job at your unit. Under these circumstances you decide to propose a 
pay cut of 5%. How do you think that your employees would find this proposal?  
 
  Acceptable   5.7 %      Not acceptable      94.3 %  
 
Scenario 2 (861 respondents). Assume hypothetically that your enterprise is making a 
small surplus. Inflation is 10% percent, and unemployment is high. There are many job 
seekers applying for a job at your unit. Under these circumstances you decide to propose a 
pay increase of only 5%. How do you think that your employees would find this proposal?  
 
  Acceptable   49.6 %     Not acceptable      50.4 % 
 
Although both scenarios have identical real implications, many managers responded that 
their employees would find it easier to accept a reduction in real wages that occurs 
through inflation, than through a nominal pay cut.
15 These results are strikingly similar to 
those reported by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1986). In their telephone survey of 
randomly selected residents of Toronto and Vancouver, 62 percent indicated that it was 
                                                            
15 In the scenarios of Kahneman et al., the firm cuts pay under scenario 1, and increases wages by less than 
inflation under scenario 2. Since there are legal obstacles to unilateral wage cuts in Sweden, we chose a 
different phrasing. Our firm proposes a certain wage change, and we asked the respondent to assess “...how 
your employees would find this proposal”. Managers were asked to rate their employees’ reactions to the 
two scenarios according to the following five alternatives: entirely unacceptable, highly unacceptable,   29
 
“unfair” to cut nominal pay under the circumstances of scenario 1, while only 22 percent 
thought the same about the five percent pay rise in scenario 2.  
  It was probably difficult for our managers to come up with well-founded answers 
to our hypothetical scenarios. Yet, we find it interesting that professional wage setters are 
as convinced that money illusion is an important phenomenon in the labor market as the 
student- and laymen-populations that participate in surveys and experiments. Shafir, 
Diamond and Tversky (1997) survey people in shopping malls and an airport, and report 
evidence from surveys of undergraduate students at Princeton University. Fehr and Tyran 
(2001) report experimental results on money illusion; subjects are undergraduates at the 
University of Zurich.  
  To analyze the determinants of money illusion we estimated a logit model, where 
the left-hand side variable took the value of 1 or 0 depending on whether the manager 
indicated that employees suffered from money illusion. This exercise showed that none of 
the background variables of Table 1 turned out to be statistically significant at the five-
percent level. This suggests that money illusion is a general phenomenon, which does not 
link up with observable worker-firm characteristics.  
 
V. The role of gender 
A large literature analyzes the role of gender in the labor market; see e.g. Altonji and 
Blank (1999). Our regressions have produced regularities that we have not seen discussed 
in this literature. Managers in units with a large share of female employees are less likely 
to indicate that disgruntled employees respond by reducing effort (Table 4), and that 
profits/ability to pay (Table 6) and wage comparisons (Table 7) play an important role in 
the wage bargain. One possible explanation for these findings is that the share of female 
                                                                                                                                                                              
hardly acceptable, acceptable subject to qualifications, and acceptable. To arrive at the results of the main   30
 
employees simply picks up differences in unmeasured worker-firm characteristics. To 
address this issue Table 8 shows the effect of successively adding more worker-firm 
controls to the estimating equation. The idea is that if the share of female employees picks 
up differences in unmeasured worker characteristics/working conditions the coefficient on 
female should become smaller and less statistically significant as we move down the 
table. The first row shows the results from an ordered logit regression where the share of 
female employees is the only regressor. Row 2 adds the continuous controls of Table 1, 
rows 3 and 4 add one- or two-digit controls for sectoral affiliation, row 5 adds our 
measure of monitoring ability, and row 6 adds information about firms’ pay systems.  
In columns 1 and 2 we can see that there is a negative and highly significant 
univariate correlation between the share of female employees and the importance attached 
to profits/ability to pay and external wages in the wage bargain. As we expand the number 
of controls in rows 2-6 the coefficients on share of female employees stay approximately 
unchanged, and precisely estimated. Column 3 shows that the univariate correlation 
between share of female employees and our measure of negative reciprocity is 
numerically small, and not significantly different from zero. The following rows show 
that this is entirely due to the omission of other covariates. In rows 2-6 the coefficient on 
the share of female employees is statistically significant at the five- or one-percent levels.  
Unless the variation in remaining unmeasured worker/firm characteristics is more 
important than the variation in measured worker/firm characteristics that we control for in 
Table 8 the conclusion seems to be that gender has an independent impact. In our sample 
establishments with a large share of female employees have lower earnings, an effect that 
survives even as we introduce a range of controls for sectoral affiliation and worker-firm  
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characteristics. The results reported in this section suggest that part of the explanation 
might be that (i) women are less aggressive wage bargainers, in the sense that they pay 
less attention to external wages and profits/ability to pay, and (ii) that women feel 
greater loyalty to their employer, in the sense that they are less prone to counter a 
perceived wage inequity with acts of negative reciprocity.  
Though we acknowledge the speculative nature of these conclusions, some 
recent evidence point in a similar direction. Säve-Söderbergh (2002) uses unique data 
about requested starting salaries, and offered starting salaries, for a homogenous 
sample of almost 4000 Swedish university graduates. Even as she controls for a wide-
variety of job- and worker-specific characteristics, there is a residual gender effect, 
indicating that women ask for lower salaries than men. Recent experimental studies 
indicating that men and women exhibit different degrees of “selfishness” include e.g. 
Eckel and Grossman (1998), who conclude that “…women are less selfish than men 
when confounding factors are eliminated”, and Dufwenberg and Muren (2002).  
 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper asks professional wage setters about the reasons for wage rigidity. Our 
methodological value added compared to previous surveys is that we use a fully 
representative sampling design, and that we have access to extensive worker-firm 
background data allowing us to identify new behavioral regularities. Our main results 
can be summarized as follows. First, during a prolonged recession with very high 
unemployment and near-zero inflation nominal wage cuts were very rare. This seems 
to lend support to those macroeconomists who argue that adjustments to 
macroeconomic shocks may take a long time. Second, we report substantial evidence   33
 
that endogenous wage rigidity – including behavioral mechanisms involving 
reciprocity and money illusion – play an important role also in a labor market where 
union density is high and government regulation widespread. Third, sources of 
endogenous wage rigidity differ significantly between different segments of the labor 
market, and between firms in different size classes. We have also identified gender 
effects, which we have not seen discussed elsewhere.  
Fourth, we have found much evidence that sources of wage rigidity interact. 
Many popular macroeconomic models trace wage rigidity to the bargaining power of 
incumbent workers; here, we have reported evidence that bargaining power is 
reinforced by efficiency wage mechanisms involving reciprocity and voluntary 
turnover, and by strict job protection. Similarly, it is an old argument that workers’ 
concern about relative pay may explain why wages do not fall in spite of high 
unemployment; here, we have presented evidence that unions foster rigidities due to 
interdependent preferences. We conjecture that such interactions between “exogenous 
institutions” and endogenous mechanisms may be part of the reason why the Swedish 
wage floor is so complete. It seems like an important research topic for the future to 
develop theoretical models of how e.g. behavioral mechanisms of wage rigidity 
interact with exogenous institutions.  
A final disclaimer is in order. Since there are a limited number of questions that 
can be added to a single survey we focus on a narrow set of issues. We emphasize 
mechanisms of wage rigidity that operate at the level of the establishment, and we have 
more questions about endogenous sources of wage rigidity than about exogenous 
institutions. Surveys that specifically deal with e.g. legal institutions seem like a useful 
complement to the present study. However, to fully explore the effects of country-  34
 
specific institutions it appears that a broader survey design is called for, like sending 
out the same questionnaire to firms in countries with different institutions.    35
 
References 
Agell, J. and H. Bennmarker, 2002, “Wage policy and endogenous wage rigidity: a 
representative view from the inside,” Working Paper No. 2002:12, Institute for 
Labour Market Policy Evaluation. 
Agell, J. and P. Lundborg, 1995, “Theories of pay and unemployment: survey 
evidence from Swedish manufacturing firms,” Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics 97, 295-307.  
Agell, J. and P. Lundborg, 2003, “Survey evidence on wage rigidity and 
unemployment: Sweden in the 1990s,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 
105, 15-29.  
Akerlof, G., 1982, “Labor contracts as partial gift exchange,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 97, 543-569.  
Albaek, K., M. Arai, R. Asplund, E. Barth, and E. Strøjer Madsen, 1998, “Measuring 
wage effects of plant size,” Labour Economics 5, 425-448. 
Altonji, J. G. and R. Blank, “Race and gender in the labor market,” in Handbook of 
Labor Economics, volume 3C (eds. O. Ashenfelter and D. Card), Elsevier: 
Amsterdam 
Andrews, I. R. and M. M. Henry, 1963, “Management attitudes toward pay,” 
Industrial Relations 3, 29-39.  
Arai, M., 2001, “Wages, profits and capital intensity: evidence from matched worker-
firm data,” forthcoming, Journal of Labor Economics.  
Ball, L. and D. Romer, 1990, ”Real rigidities and the nonneutrality of money,” Review 
of Economic Studies 57, 183-203.  
Bertola, G., 1999, “Microeconomic perspectives on aggregate labor markets,” in 
Handbook of Labor Economics, volume 3C (eds. O. Ashenfelter and D. Card), 
Elsevier: Amsterdam 
Bewley, T., 1995, “A depressed labor market as explained by participants,” American 
Economic Review 85 (Papers and Proceedings), 250-54. 
Bewley, T., 1998, “Why not cut pay?” European Economic Review 42 (Papers and 
proceedings), 459-90. 
Bewley, T., 1999, Why wages don’t fall during a recession. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge (Ma.) and London, England.    36
 
Blinder, A. and D. Choi, 1990, “A shred of evidence on theories of wage stickiness,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 105, 1003-15. 
Calmfors, L., A. Forslund and M. Hemström, 2002, “Does active labour market policy 
work? Lessons from the Swedish experience,” Swedish Economic Policy 
Review 8, 61-124.  
Campbell, C. M. and K. S. Kamlani, 1997, “The reasons for wage rigidity: Evidence from 
a Survey of Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 759-89. 
Christofides, L. N. and T. Stengos, 2001, “Wage rigidity in Canadian collective 
bargaining agreements,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 56, 429-448. 
Dufwenberg, M. and A. Muren, 2002, “Discrimination by gender and social distance,” 
Working Paper No. 2002:2, Department of Economics, Stockholm University. 
Eckel, C. C. and P. J. Grossman, 1998, “Are women less selfish than men? Evidence 
from dictator experiments,” The Economic Journal 108, 726-735.  
Ekberg, J., 2002, “Nominal wage rigidity on the Swedish labor market,” Licentiate thesis, 
Stockholm School of Economics.  
Encinosa, W. E., M. Gaynor and J. B. Rebitzer, 1997, “The sociology of groups and the 
economics of incentives: theory and evidence on compensation systems,” NBER 
Working Paper No. 5953, Boston. 
Fehr, E. and A. Falk, 1999, “Wage rigidity in a competitive incomplete contract 
market,” Journal of Political Economy 107, 106-134. 
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter, 2000, “Fairness and retaliation: the economics of 
reciprocity,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, 159-181. 
Fehr, E. and L. Goette, 2000, “Robustness and real consequences of nominal wage 
rigidity,” CESifo Working Paper No. 335, Munich. 
Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger and A. Riedl, 1993, “Does fairness prevent market clearing? 
An experimental investigation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 437-
459. 
Fehr, E. and J.-R., Tyran, 2001, “Does Money Illusion Matter?” American Economic 
Review 91, 1239-1262.  
Holden, S., 1994, “Wage bargaining and nominal rigidities,” European Economic 
Review 38, 1021-1039.  
Holden, S., 1998, “Wage drift and the relevance of centralized wage setting,” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 100, 711-731.   37
 
Holden, S., 2002, “The costs of price stability -- downward nominal wage rigidity in 
Europe,” NBER Working Paper No. 8865, Boston. 
Howitt, P., 2002, “Looking inside the labor market: a review article,” Journal of 
Economic Literature 40, 125-138. 
Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch and R. Thaler, 1986, “Fairness as a constraint on profit 
seeking: entitlements in the market,” American Economic Review 76, 728-741.  
Kaufman, R., 1984, “On wage stickiness in Britain’s competitive sector,” British 
Journal of Industrial Relations 22, 101-112.  
Keynes, J. M., 1925, The economic consequences of Mr. Churchill. Reissued in 1972 
in The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol.IX (Essays in 
persuasion). London and Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Keynes, J. M.. 1936, The general theory of employment, interest and money. 
Macmillan, London.  
Levine, D., 1993, “Fairness, markets, and ability to pay: Evidence from compensation 
executives,” American Economic Review 83, 1241-59.  
Lindbeck, A., 1997, “The Swedish experiment,” Journal of Economic Literature 35, 
1273-1319. 
MacLeod, W. B. and J. M. Malcomson, 1993, “Investments, holdup, and the form of 
market contracts,” American Economic Review 83, 811-837. 
McDonald, I. and R. Solow, 1981, “Wage bargaining and employment,” American 
Economic Review 71, 896-908.  
Säve-Söderbergh, J., 2002, ”Are women asking for too low wages? Gender wage 
differentials and individual wage bargaining,” mimeo, Stockholm University.  
Shafir, E., P. Diamond and A. Tversky, 1997, “Money illusion,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 112, 341-74.  
Shapiro, C. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1984, “Equilibrium unemployment as a worker 
discipline device,” American Economic Review 74, 433-444. 
Solow, R. M., 1990, The labor market as a social institution. Basil Blackwell, 
Cambridge (MA.).  
Summers, L. H.,1988, “Relative wages, efficiency wages, and Keynesian 
unemployment,” American Economic Review 78, 383-388.    38
 





Total no. of 
































Manufacturing, 20-99 employees 
 
3,998  171,330  100    98    77  78.6 
Manufacturing, 100- employees 
 
1,284  426,451  100    99    83  83.8 
Unskilled services, 5-19  employees 
 
3,090  27,481  100    98    45  45.9 
Unskilled services, 20-99 employees 
 
            894  33,959  100  100    63  63.0 
Unskilled services, 100- employees  
 
              50  8,154    50    49    32  65.3 
Skilled services, 5-19 employees 
 
5,906  52,552  100    99    69  69.7 
Skilled services, 20-99 employees 
 
1,606  60,851  100    98    74  75.5 
Skilled services, 100- employees 
 
            232  60,600  100    97    76  78.4 
Public administration, 5-19 employees 
 
1,699  18,942  100    96    76  79.2 
Public administration, 20-99 employees 
 
1,762  74,960  100    99    88  88.8 
















Notes: According to NACE, the industrial classification system of the European Union, manufacturing is group D, unskilled services group H, and Public 
Administration group L. Skilled services include subgroups K72, K73, and part of K74. Since the total population of unskilled service units in the largest size 
category consisted of only 50 units, we reallocated 50 random drawings to the stratum consisting of small, manufacturing units. Our net samples deviate from the 
gross samples because some units ceased operation between the time our sample was drawn and our questionnaire sent out.   
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